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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
"write ups" in addition to the space bought;1 or to show that a
vendee by authentic act of sale had agreed to share equally with
the vendor any profits from resale of the real estate purchased;'
12
or that the vendor of phonographs had agreed verbally to have
the merchandise delivered at least two weeks before Christmas,
and to send a salesman to Louisiana to assist in demonstrating
and selling the instruments.' Parol has been admitted, however,
to show that the lessor of certain property gave verbal notice to
the lessee that no liquor could be sold on the premises, though
the restriction was not included in the written instrument;" and
the vendee of a second hand car was permitted to show that the
consideration named for the car included a sum for which the
vendor agreed verbally to secure collision insurance for the pur-
chaser."3
In accordance with the weight of Louisiana authority and
under an application of the accepted criterion, it would seem that
the parties in the instant case "naturally and normally" would
have included the alleged collateral agreement-an important
guaranty-in the written contract; thus the parol proof should
have been barred. No harm was done in the principal case, since
the evidence offered did not prove the existence of the purported
oral agreement, yet this decision should not be taken as a prece-
dent for further relaxation of the rule protecting the integrity of
written contracts.
C. O'Q.
SEPARATION FROM BED AND BOARD-"MUTUAL WRONGS" Doc-
TRINE---A wife sued for separation from bed and board on the
grounds of slander, defamation and cruel treatment. In denying
these allegations, the husband averred-without making any re-
conventional demand-that his wife had an ungovernable temper
and that, as a result of her cruelty to him, they had been living
separate and apart for more than two years. On original hearing
the plaintiff was awarded a decree of separation from bed and
11. The Item Company, Ltd., v. Wormington Machinery Power & Equip-
ment Co., Inc., 4 La. App. 519 (1926).
12. Pfeiffer v. Nienaber, 143 La. 601, 78 So. 977 (1918) (O'Niell, J., dis-
senting).
13. Brenard Mfg. Co. v. M. Levy, Inc., 161 La. 496, 109 So. 43 (1926).
14. New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company v. Darms, 39 La. Ann.
766, 2 So. 230 (1887).
15. McConnell v. Harris Chevrolet Co., Inc., 147 So. 827 (La. App. 1933).
[Vol. I
NOTES
board. Held, on rehearing, with two justices dissenting, that since
both parties were at fault, and since the complainant was not
comparatively free from wrong, no judgment could be granted
in her favor. Aragon v. Herrmann, La. Sup. Ct., Docket No.
34,577 (1938).
At an early date,1 the rule seems to have been settled that the
provisions for separation from bed and board in certain cases are
made for the relief of the oppressed party, not for the purpose of
interfering in quarrels where both parties commit reciprocal ex-
cesses and outrages. This original doctrine of mutual wrongs
was reasserted' and then qualified to the effect that the wrongs
should be similar in nature and so proportional in extent as to
render it difficult to ascertain which party is mainly at fault.
This reduced the instances of application of the broad doctrine
that reciprocal wrongs are mutually defeasible.3
From the language of a later case, Schlater v. LeBlanc,4 it
would seem that the welfare of the children is a prime factor for
consideration. In that case, a separation was granted despite the
fact that both parties were at fault since this appeared to be in
the interest of the children. On the other hand, where the facts
supported the belief that, because of children, there remained
some endearing ties which would make it possible for the spouses
to live together companionably, then the court properly applied
the doctrine of mutual wrongs in order to keep open an oppor-
tunity of reconciliation.5 In those instances where children are not
involved and both parties are guilty of equal wrongs of a serious
nature toward the other, then neither party will be granted relief
in Louisiana, as the court adheres strictly to the original rule.6
1. Durand v. Her Husband, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 174 (La. 1816).
2. Trowbridge v. Carlin, 12 La. Ann. 882, 884 (1857).
3. Thomas v. Talleu, 13 La. Ann. 127 (1858).
4. 121 La. 919, 930; 46 So. 921, 924 (1908). In this case the court stated as
follows: "All during the time . .. there were disagreements, gloom, unhappi-
ness in the family. There was suffering on the part of each, as we infer,
which would not down. There was incompatibility between the two, difference
in their natures." The court took cognizance of the incompatibility, the
chance for future happiness, the welfare of the family as a whole.
5. Castan~do v. Fortier, 34 La. Ann. 135, 136 (1882). Where the parties had
been married over twenty years and had eleven children the court justified its
dismissal of the action in the following language: "Both [of the parties] are
fond of their children and we are of the opinion ... that this common and
endearing tie, exercising a soothing and hallowing influence, renders recon-
ciliation and reunion highly probable."
6. Durand v. Her Husband, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 174 (La. 1816); Lalande v.
Jore, 5 La. Ann. 32 (1850); Amy v. Berard, 49 La. Ann. 897 (1897); Snell v.
Aucoin, 158 La. 767, 104 So. 709 (1925); Gormley v. Gormley, 161 La. 121, 108
So. 307 (1926); McKoin v. McKoin, 168 La. 32, 121 So. 182 (1929).
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In France, the strong tendency, worked out mainly with re-
gard to divorce, is to consider reciprocal fault as double reason for
releasing the parties rather than no reason at all.7 Certainly the
majority of French writers favor this view." It must not be for-
gotten, however, that particularly in the case of cruel treatment
there is much to be said for the view that mutual recriminations
due to the heat of provocation may tend to cancel one another.9
Much must also be said for the French doctrine that where mutu-
ally intolerable offenses are not present, wide discretion should
be left to the judge10 to attempt a reconciliation.
This question of whether two wrongs can ever make a right
has not been materially discussed in the Louisiana decisions. The
court has insisted upon the preservation of the marital status, but
the constant change in our customs and conventions may bring
about further modification of the present doctrine and its effects.
In the event of releasing the spouses from an impossible marital
relationship, the question as to which spouse should be granted
the decree is of no importance except as to alimony1 1 and custody
of children, the matter of primary consideration being the disso-
lution of the marriage relationship for the benefit of all parties
concerned.
W. S.
WILLS-REVOCATION OF SECOND WILL REINSTATES THE FIRST
ONE--Upon the death of the testatrix, two purported wills in olo-
graphic form were offered for probate, one dated August 27, 1927
and the other April 5, 1928. The will bearing the posterior date con-
7. "Lorsque Ie demandeur est lui-mgme coupable envers son conjoint, la
seule consdquence de ce fait eat que lea causes du divorce existent en double,
et qu'il y a deux raisons au lieu d'une pour Ie prononcer." 1 Planiol, Trait6
El~mentalre de Droit Civil (12 ed. 1937) 422, no 1205.
(Translation) "When the plaintiff is himself guilty towards his spouse,
the only consequence of this fact is that the grounds for divorce are double,
and that there are two reasons instead of one for pronouncing it." See also
1 Marcad6, Explication Th~orlque et Pratique du Code Napoleon (5 ed. 1852)
607, no 769.
8. See 1 Colin et Capitant, Cours Elmentaire de Droit Civil Frangais
(8 ed. 1934) 216, no 189 (5).
9. Cass., 18 Janv. 1881, Dalloz. 1881.1.125; Cass., 12 janv. 1903, Sirey.1903.1.
279.
10. 7 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangals (5 ed. 1913) 301-302,
§ 477.
11. See Mouille v. Schutten, 190 La. 841, 865, 183 So. 191, 198-199 (1938)
(O'Niell, C.J., dissenting on the admission of testimony, not on the merits).
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